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This paper examines the interaction between root causes, domestic policy considerations and the use
of extremism as a strategic tool in an external conﬂict. Within a two-country three-stage game, we show
that, in general, domestic policies will be used strategically to achieve the desired level of extremism. We
also show that the level of extremism decreases and social/economic conditions improve when a country
becomes wealthier, more powerful, more socially concerned, less nationalistic, relatively less concerned
with external considerations and when the value of the contested asset decreases. These eﬀects are due to
external strategic considerations, rather than domestic ones.
Keywords: Extremism, Root Causes, Credible Threats, Bargaining, Power, Social/Economic Condi-
tions.
01 Introduction
In the aftermath of 9/11, the problem of extremism has become the subject of endless debates, as well
as numerous articles in the academic literature.1 Some people argue that extremism is rooted in cultural,
historical, or religious factors, others suggest that the focus should be on “root causes”,2 whereas a third
approach views extremism as a strategic tool in politics and conﬂicts.3
Often the discussion of root causes focuses on underlying economic conditions. The standard argument
is that “diﬃcult economic conditions” tend to provide breeding grounds for extremism. There is, indeed,
some empirical evidence to support the correlation between economic well-being measures and the level of
extremism. For example, Muller & Weede (1990), Blomberg, Hess & Weerapana (2004b) and Drakos & Gofas
(2004) ﬁnd that high levels of economic well-being measures (e.g., high rates of economic growth), reduce the
incidence of terrorism and political violence. Honaker (2004) reports that increases in Catholic unemployment
lead to increases in Republican violence and increases in Protestant unemployment lead to increases in Loyalist
violence. Similarly, Santos Bravo & Mendes Dias (2006), use 1997-2004 data for two large regions of Eurasia
to show that the number of terrorist incidents is negatively associated with the level of development, but
positively related to mineral reserves and non-democratic political regimes. Piazza (2006), on the other hand,
ﬁnds that it is “social cleavage”, rather than economics variables that can better explain terrorism.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model in which both underlying root causes and strategic consid-
erations play a role in determining the level of extremism.4 Speciﬁcally, the paper focuses on the interaction
between root causes, domestic social/economic policy considerations and the use of extremism as a strategic
tool in an external conﬂict. Extremism is viewed here as the product of underlying root causes, which reﬂect
both domestic and external conditions; for example, social/economic conditions (SEC) and the outcome of
the external conﬂict. At the same time, we also recognize that extremism is strategically useful because it
provides a credible threat. Consequently, given the strategic usefulness of extremism and since extremism is
determined by underlying root causes, there is an incentive to manipulate internal policies in order to achieve
the desired level of extremism. In other words, there will be an incentive to “create the strategically desir-
able” root causes. This means that empirical ﬁndings on the correlation between economic well-being and
extremism, may simply reﬂect strategic policy choices.
The paper examines the interaction between root causes and the strategic use of extremism within a two-
country three-stage game. Assuming that only one country acts strategically, we show that in general, an
equilibrium exists in which domestic policies are used strategically to achieve the required root causes and
1consequently the desired level of extremism. We use the model to study the determinants of social/economic
conditions and extremism. We ﬁnd that when a country becomes wealthier, more powerful, or more socially
concerned, its level of extremism decreases and its social/economic conditions improve. These eﬀects, including
the eﬀects on SEC, are due to external strategic considerations, rather than domestic ones. On the other hand,
when the value of the contested asset, nationalism, or the relative weight given to external considerations
increase, a country’s level of extremism increases and its social/economic conditions deteriorate (again, due
to external strategic considerations, rather than domestic ones).
2T h e M o d e l
We consider two rival countries (governments, leaders, etc.), in a conﬂict over a contested asset. The value of
the contested asset is b and the countries’ initial assets are a1 and a2, respectively. We assume that country
2 chooses its internal policy, s, by taking into account both internal and external considerations. Its internal
considerations are the usual ones and will be discussed below only brieﬂy. External considerations take into
account the fact that internal policy choices aﬀect the country’s level of extremism and that extremism, in
turn, is a strategic tool in the conﬂict. For simplicity, we assume that country 1 does not pursue the same
strategy. Namely, country 1 chooses its internal policy, s1, based on internal considerations alone and does
not use it as a strategic tool in the external conﬂict. We, therefore, assume that country 1’s internal policy is
given.
Extremism is strategically useful because it provides a credible threat, thus enhancing country 2’s bargain-
ing position in the conﬂict. At the same time, extremism also involves a risk: it can cause direct damage to
assets. Greater extremism is, therefore, a double-edged sword and consequently, its usefulness as a strategic
tool is determined by the balance of these two considerations.
Given the strategic usefulness of extremism, and since extremism is determined by underlying root causes,
it follows that, in general, there will be an incentive to manipulate internal policies, and hence root causes,
in order to achieve the desired level of extremism. In other words, there will be an incentive to “create the
strategically desirable” root causes. Paraphrasing Noam Chomsky; there will be a tendency to “Manufacture
Dissent” (See Herman & Chomsky (1988)).5
When we consider the role of extremism, it is useful to separate between its supply and demand. A credible
threat, regardless of who provides it, or why it is provided, is beneﬁcial because it improves one’s bargaining
position. This means that, in general, there will be demand for credibility, hence extremism. The existence
2of extremists and the explanation for their behaviour, on the other hand, is a question of supply. Clearly, to
be able to use extremism as a strategic tool, someone has to be able and willing to supply it. The question of
why extremists behave the way they do, is most interesting and has, indeed, been discussed extensively in the
economic, political historical and psychological literature.6 Moreover, regardless of why extremists behave the
way they do, their existence is a fact of life. In this paper we, therefore, focus on the demand for, rather than
the supply of, extremism. Instead of modeling the precise behaviour of extremists (the supply question), we
focus on the use of extremism as a strategic tool in the conﬂict (the demand question).
Extremism is characterized by the fact that its existence can, with some probability, result in an “extremist
episode”, whose consequence is that a fraction of assets will be destroyed. In the following we refer to such an
event as an “explosion”. The attractiveness of using extremism as a strategic tool is that it provides a credible
threat: the mere existence of extremism implies that there is a chance that an explosion will occur; and if
and when it occurs, some assets will be damaged. Since we assumed that only country 2 uses extremism as a
strategic tool in the conﬂict, we also assume that an explosion can be caused only by country 2’s extremists.7
2.1 Root Causes:
Although we do not try to explain the behaviour of extremists precisely, we do capture the root causes behind
extremists’ explosions, at least partially. Since country 1 is assumed not to pursue strategic extremism, we
focus on the root causes of extremism in country 2.
Individuals in country 2 may care about many issues, but for simplicity we assume that there are only
two issues that can act as root causes of extremism: one internal and one external. The external issue is
captured by the share of the contested asset (z) that country 2 receives in the conﬂict. The internal issue is
related to social/economic conditions, such as: income distribution, social/economic justice, living conditions,
economic opportunities etc., which have traditionally been associated with social “discontent”, or “anger”. In
the following, we refer to theses as “social/economic conditions” (SEC) , denoted by 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
We assume that each individual, in country 2, has an “acceptable” share of the contested asset, denoted by
η. Each individual also has an acceptable level of a measure of SEC, denoted by r. Individuals are, therefore,
characterized by their acceptable levels, (η,r). For simplicity, we assume that η and r are distributed according
to the uniform distribution function:
f(η,r)=
½
1 if 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1
0 otherwise (1)
The distribution f(η,r) enables us to construct simple measures of social discontent, frustration, or anger.
3For any given share, z, and a measure of social conditions, s, let the “external and internal related” measures
of anger of individual η,r be given by: γ(η − z) , if η ≥ z but 0 otherwise, and μ(r − s) , if r ≥ s2 , but 0
otherwise, respectively, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1.8 In other words, unacceptable outcomes are costly,
but acceptable outcomes have zero costs. The parameters γ and μ reﬂect the costs per “unit of distance” and
can, thus, be viewed a measuring the importance of nationalistic and social/economic concerns, respectively.
For simplicity, we take γ and μ to be the same for all individuals. In this example, we simply take the measure
of total anger as the sum of the nationalistic and social/economic measures of anger. For any given share, z,






[γ(η − z)+μ(r − s)]dη dr (2)
From (2), it follows that the measure of total anger in Country 2 is decreasing and convex in z and s, but
because of the additivity, ∂2x/∂z∂s =0 .
In the following, we use the measure of total anger, x, to capture (deﬁne) the level of extremism in Country
2. Thus, extremism in this model is determined by underlying root causes; both internal and external.
The probability of an explosion, denoted as 1 − q, is related to total anger in country 2. For example, it
can be captured by a standard cost function, which is increasing and convex in total anger. For simplicity, we
take it as:
1 − q(z,s)=xβ(z,s) (3)
where β ≥ 1. Alternatively, the probability that there would be no explosion, q, is given by:
q(z,s)=1− xβ(z,s) (4)
This can be viewed as a “production function”, the “output” being no explosion, that is, you produce “political
peace and quiet”.
What are the root causes here? Extremism is determines by the share and social conditions: z and s.
We can think of z and s as the external and internal root causes, respectively. However, while s is a policy
instrument, z is determined in the bargaining process, so it depends on s. It is, therefore, clear that if
extremism is useful in the external conﬂict, and if root causes lead to extremism, the government will choose
s, to manipulate root causes. In this sense, it is the usefulness of extremism that “creates the root causes.”
2.2 Internal Policy Considerations
When choosing its domestic policy, s, country 2 also has internal, in addition to external, considerations.
Since the focus of the paper is not on internal policy considerations, we do not discuss this part in detail, but
4simply assume that government 2’s domestic net beneﬁts from its policy choice are given by the concave net
beneﬁts function D2(s;ρ), where ρ represents the parameters of the domestic beneﬁts function (an example of
an e td o m e s t i cb e n e ﬁts function is given in section 4). This beneﬁts function may include internal direct costs,
opportunity costs, direct beneﬁts, and ideological beneﬁts/costs of s. Country 1’s internal beneﬁts function is
given by D1(s1), where s1 is taken as given.
2.3 Time Line
The conﬂict between the two countries has the following time line:
1. In stage 1, country 2 chooses (non-cooperatively) its internal SEC policy: it chooses s.
2. In stage 2, given county 2’s choice of SEC and the two countries’ disagreement utilities (discussed
immediately below), the two countries engage in bargaining over the division of the contested asset. The
shares, z, (1 − z) are determined in this stage.
3. We assume that in case of disagreement, the contested asset “disappears” and a fraction, k, of the initial
assets is lost. Furthermore, the countries’ total net domestic beneﬁts are then given by: D1,D 2.10
4. No actions by the governments are taken beyond these two stages. Given the choice of policy by country 2
and the outcome of the bargaining game, an explosion occurs with probability 1−q(z,s).I fa ne x p l o s i o n
occurs, a fraction λ of b and a fraction k of the initial assets are lost.
3 The Solution of the Game
3.1 Last stage: An Extremist Explosion
At this stage, given the shares, z,(1−z) and the policy choice of country 2, an explosion occurs with probability
1 − q(z,s). The two governments’ expected payoﬀs, ui,i=1 ,2, are given by:
u1 ≡ θ1F1(z,s)+ ( 1− θ1)D1(s1)+a1 (5)
u2 ≡ θ2F2(z,s)+ ( 1− θ2)D2(s)+a2 (6)
where {θ1,(1 − θ1)}, {θ2,(1 − θ2)} are the weights that the two governments attach to their foreign and
domestic considerations, and where their foreign (expected) beneﬁts are given by:
F1(z,s) ≡ [q(z,s2)b(1 − z)+( 1− q(z,s2))b(1 − z)(1 − λ)] − k(1 − q)a1 (7)
F2(z,s) ≡ [q(z,s2)bz +( 1− q(z,s2))bz(1 − λ)] − k(1 − q)a2 (8)
53.2 Second Stage: Determination of Bargaining Shares
Since the bargaining process itself is not the focus of the paper, we choose a particular bargaining solution as
an illustration; speciﬁcally, we use the Generalized Nash Bargaining solution.11 This solution can be obtained




0 ≤ z ≤ 1,u i ≥ u0
i} i =1 ,2
where the two countries’ disagreement utilities, u0
i, are given by:
u0
i = ai − θi [k(1 − q)ai]+( 1− θi)Di(si) (10)
and where the parameter 0 <α<1 capture County 2’s bargaining power. In the standard Nash bargaining
solution, rivals have equal power so that α =1 /2.
Using equations (5)-(8) and (10), the bargaining problem can be written as:
Maxz{(θ2bz[1 − λ + λq])α(θ1b(1 − z)[1 − λ + λq])(1−α), 0 ≤ z ≤ 1} (11)
and it is easy to show that the objective function in (11) is concave in z (see Appendix A.1). Let the bargaining
solution be given by: z∗(s;γ,μ,α,λ,β). Note that problem (11) can be written as:
Maxz π(z;α) J(z;s) (12)
where J(·) ≡ [1−λ+λq] and π(z;α) ≡ b{[θ2z]α[θ1(1−z)](1−α). Now, let us compare the solution to problem
(11) to the solution in the case without extremism, which is obtained from the problem:
Maxz = π(z;α) (13)
Let the solution to problem (13) be given by z0(α). It can be easily veriﬁed that z0(α) is simply given by the
bargaining power of country 2, namely,
z0(α)=α (14)
If both parties have the same bargaining power we get an equal division: z0(1/2) = 1/2.
How does the strategic use of extremism change this result? Clearly, the optimal shares will now reﬂect the
two countries’ relative powers and country 2’s strategic use of extremism. To isolate the eﬀects of extremism,
6let us ﬁrst assume that both countries have equal powers: α =1−α = .5. It is easy to verify that in this case,
∂J(z0(.5))
∂z > 0, which implies that:
z∗ > 1/2 (15)
In other words, if both countries have equal power, but country 2 uses extremism strategically, county 2 will
obtain a higher bargaining share. In this sense, the use of extremism is indeed attractive.
More generally, even if country 2 is weaker, it is still true that (see Appendix A.1. for proof):
z∗ >z 0(α)=α (16)
That is, a weaker country will increase its share if it uses extremism strategically. Country 2’s share may now
be larger, or smaller than country 1’s share, depending on whether the extremism advantage outweighs the
power disadvantage. In any case, it seems that a weaker country may be able to use extremism to overcome
its power disadvantage. This point will be pursued further once we determine the equilibrium levels of the
shares and extremism.
I nt h en e x ts e c t i o nw ee x a m i n et h ec h o i c eo fs and the consequent level of extremism. But, before we do
that, it is necessary to determine the eﬀects of SEC on the countries’ bargaining shares. Furthermore, to be
able to examine the determinants of SEC and extremism, we ﬁrst have to know how the various parameters
aﬀect the bargaining shares. We now look at these eﬀects.
From the ﬁrst order conditions for problem (11) we can obtain the following comparative statics results
























=0 ,i =1 ,2
In other words:
1. Country 2’s bargaining share increases when its social/economic conditions deteriorate. This eﬀect
captures the essence of the strategic advantage of using the SEC policy as a tool in the external conﬂict.
2. Country 2’s bargaining share increases (decreases) with its power (country 1’s power).
3. Country 2’s bargaining share increases with the destructiveness of extremism.
4. A change in the value of the contested asset does not aﬀect s.
75. An increase in country 2’s nationalism (captured by γ) increases its bargaining share.
6. An increase in the importance of social concerns in country 2 (captured by μ) increases its bargaining
share.
7. An increase in the initial wealth (ai), or the weights that the two governments attach to their foreign
(or domestic) beneﬁts (θi)d o e sn o ta ﬀect the bargaining share.
Finally, it should be noted that results 2-7 in equations (17) are only partial eﬀects. That is, they do not
take into account the fact that a change in a parameter (other than s, of course) will also aﬀect s. The total
eﬀects (which also account for changes in s) will be obtained below, after we examine the determinants of s.
3.3 First Stage: Optimal SEC Policy and the Equilibrium Level of Extremism
T h eo p t i m a lS E Cp o l i c yi nc o u n t r y2i sd e t e r m i n e di nt his stage. Using equations (6) and (8), the expected
payoﬀ for country 2 can be written as:
V2(s;ϕ) ≡ u2(z∗,s)= θ2F2[z∗(s;·),s]+ ( 1− θ2)D2(s;·)+a2 (18)
where the vector ϕ =( γ,μ,α,λ,b,k,β,θ2,a 2,ρ) represents all the underlying parameters.
Country 2 chooses its SEC policy to maximize its payoﬀ, V2, taking into account the optimal bargaining
share z∗(s;·). Its problem is, therefore, given by:
Maxs V2(s;ϕ) (19)
Let the corresponding optimal solution be denoted by s∗(ϕ).12 The corresponding equilibrium level of extrem-
ism is, therefore, given by: x∗[z∗(s∗),s ∗] ≡ x∗(ϕ).
To understand the nature of the solution it is useful to consider ﬁrst what happens in the two extreme
cases, when θ2 =0and when θ2 =1 , that is: when country 2 has only domestic, or only foreign considerations.
When θ2 =0 , country 2 chooses it optimal policy by solving the problem:
max
s D2(s;·) (20)




On the other hand when θ2 =1 , c o u n t r y2c h o o s e si to p t i m a lp o l i c yb ys o l v i n gt h ep r o b l e m :
max
s F2[z∗(s);s] (22)
8Can this problem have an interior solution for s? To answer this question, note that the eﬀect of a change in








2 are Country 2’s foreign marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of s,d e ﬁned as:
MBF













2 is always strictly negative, or strictly positive , we can expect to have an interior
solution for s. In other words (for a concave F2(s;·) function with 0 ≤ s ≤ 1), in general, there exists an
optimal policy, say sf(γ,μ,α,λ,b,k,a2,β), such that
∂F2[sf;·]
∂s
= MB(sf;·) − MC(sf;·)=0 (25)
Figure 1 shows the foreign beneﬁts function for the parameter values: γ =1 ,μ =1 ,α = .5,λ = .5,b =1 ,
k = .1,a 2 =1 ,β=2 . As the ﬁgure shows, F2(s;·) is concave and the solution, sf, exists and is unique.
The values of sd and sf are determined by the domestic and foreign net beneﬁts functions (D2[s;·] and
F2[z∗(s;·),s;·]) and their parameters (ρ and {γ,μ,α,λ,b,k,a2,β}, respectively). We have two possible con-
ﬁgurations to consider (we ignore the case where sd = sf.): Case 1: sd >s f, Case 2: sd <s f. In Case 1, we
have
sf <s ∗ <s d (26)
but, in Case 2 we have
sd <s ∗ <s f (27)
Which of these two cases occurs depends on all the parameters of the problem. Speciﬁcally, parameter changes
that shift the foreign net marginal beneﬁts (
∂F2[sf;·]
∂s ) upward, make it more likely for Case 1 to occur. On the
other hand, parameter changes that shift the domestic net marginal beneﬁts (
∂D2[sd;·]
∂s ) upward, make it more
likely for Case 2 to occur. The eﬀects of the parameters on these two net marginal beneﬁts and consequently
on s∗(ϕ) will be examined in the next section. For our purposes, however, Case 1 is more interesting. In
this case, County 2 uses its SEC policy strategically, by lowering s (relative to its purely domestically desired
level) in order to increase extremism, which in turn improves its bargaining outcome. In Case 2, Country 2’s
domestically driven level of SEC is low enough that even for foreign strategic reasons, s needs to be improved.
9That is, the high level of extremism is now, actually, a strategic liability. In the following we, therefore, focus
on Case 1 (but, we also point out how the results diﬀer in Case 2).
4 The Determinants of Social/Economic Conditions and Extrem-
ism
In this section we explain what determines the optimal SEC policy and the consequent equilibrium levels of
extremism. We consider the eﬀects of changes that eﬀect external and internal considerations and a change
in the weights of internal and external beneﬁts in country 2’s choice of policy.13
From the ﬁrst order condition for problem (19) we obtain the following results (see Appendix A.3 for
derivations):
1. The Eﬀects of a Change in Initial Wealth:
An increase in Country 2’s initial wealth decreases the attractiveness of extremism as an external strategic
tool in the conﬂict (∂F2[s,·]/∂s shifts upward). A higher initial wealth, therefore, increases s∗ and decreases







Thus, as country 2 becomes wealthier, its SEC improve. This, however, does not reﬂect an improvement in
SEC due to greater aﬄuence (which could occur, for example, if initial wealth aﬀected the domestic marginal
beneﬁts function). Instead, it reﬂects an improvement in SEC which is due to external strategic considerations.
As a result of the increase in s, the equilibrium level of extremism decreases. In this sense, the often heard
claim that extremism is a “poor man’s F16” is, in fact, conﬁrmed. This result is consistent with the empirical
ﬁndings that were cited in the introduction.
2. Eﬀects of a Change in The Size of the Contested Asset:
An increase in b raises the stakes in the conﬂict, thus making extremism more attractive as a strategic tool
(∂F2[s,·]/∂s shifts down). Consequently, SEC in country 2 deteriorate and extremism increases (the opposite







3. Eﬀects of a Change in Power:
10A stronger country gets a higher share of the contested asset anyway. Using the risky strategic tool of
extremism is, therefore, less attractive when Country 2 becomes more powerful (∂F2[s,·]/∂s shifts upward).







In this sense, as it is often argued, extremism is, indeed, a weak country’s weapon of choice.14
4. Eﬀects of a Change in Destructiveness:
I. An increase in extremism’s destructiveness vis-à-vis the contested asset (a higher λ) makes extremism








II. An increase in extremism’s destructiveness vis-à-vis the initial asset (a higher k) makes extremism








5. Eﬀects of a Change in Nationalistic Feelings:
As Country 2 becomes more nationalistic (γ increases), extremism becomes strategically more attractive







6. Eﬀects of a Change in the Importance of Social Concerns:
An increase in the importance of social concerns in Country 2 (a higher μ) will shift its ∂F2[s,·]/∂s upwards,







7. Eﬀects of a Change in the Weights of External considerations in country 2:
An increase in θ2 means that internal considerations become less important. As a result extremism becomes
strategically more useful (∂F2/∂s − ∂D2/∂s shifts downward). Thus, not surprisingly, s∗ decreases and the







118. A Change in Parameters Aﬀecting Internal Considerations:
I. The parameters that aﬀect the domestic net marginal beneﬁts, are given by the vector ρ. Since the total







∂s ), it is clear that any parameter change in the vector ρ that shifts
∂D2[s,·]
∂s upward, makes
extremism less attractive, thus increasing s and decreasing extremism.
Consider a simple example. Suppose that one of the components of domestic beneﬁts captures Coun-
try 2’s government’s ideological position. Speciﬁcally, let its “ideal” SEC policy, be given by v2. Assuming
that deviations from the ideal policy are costly, the net ideological beneﬁts can be written, for example, as
I2(s;v2,g 2)=v2 −g2(v2 − s)2, where g2 is government 2’s cost per “unit distance” from its ideal policy. An
increase in v2 indicates that the government becomes more “socially concerned”. Not surprisingly, this implies
that
∂D2[s,·]
∂s shifts upward and as a result extremism becomes less attractive strategically, thus increasing s
and decreasing extremism. Similarly, an increase in the internal costs of the SEC policy will decrease s and
increase extremism.
9. Eﬀects on Other Policies:
We can use the results above to determine how changes in the environment aﬀect other policies, by
examining a simple, but more general framework. For example, let government 2’s net domestic beneﬁts from
policies s,s1...sn, be given by the beneﬁts function W2(s,s1n;ρ), where s1n ≡ (s1...sn). For any given s,
deﬁne the restricted indirect beneﬁts function as D2(s;ρ) ≡ maxs1n W2(s,s1n;ρ). Deﬁne the optimal other
policies as: s∗
1n = s∗
1n(s;ρ) ≡ argmaxs1n W2(s,s1n;ρ). The net beneﬁts function that we use in the paper can,
therefore, be viewed as a restricted indirect beneﬁts function.
Once we explain how strategic considerations aﬀect s and extremism, we can also show how they aﬀect
other policies. To see note that, when a parameter, say ϕ, changes, it may have both direct and indirect














∂ϕ,i =1 ..n. If ϕ does not appear in the domestic beneﬁts function,








∂ϕ. Thus, for all parameters that are not in the domestic beneﬁts
function, a change that increases s will increases “complement policies” (those for which dsi/ds > 0), but
decreases “substitute policies” (those for which dsi/ds < 0). For example, an increase in the power of Country
2 will increase si for all i ∈ complement policies, but decrease si for all i ∈ substitute policies. On the other
hand, for parameters that are in the domestic beneﬁts function, a change that increases s will have a positive
indirect (but, not necessarily total) eﬀect on complement policies, but a negative indirect eﬀect on substitute
policies.The overall eﬀect, in this case, also depends on the direct eﬀect of the parameter change.
1210. The Overall Eﬀects on the Probability of an Explosion
Given the eﬀects on s and x it is now easy to calculate the overall eﬀects of a change in the parameters on
the probability of an extremist explosion. Consider a change in a parameter, say δ. Since 1−q(z,s)=xβ(z,s),






Hence, a change in a parameter aﬀects extremism and the probability of an explosion in the same way.
11. The Overall Eﬀects on the Bargaining Share
Finally, given the eﬀects on s, we can now also calculate the total eﬀects of parameter changes on the































The eﬀects of a change in the α and μ, however, are ambiguous qualitatively, since the two eﬀects in equation
(37), have opposite signs. For example, as Country 2 becomes more powerful, the direct eﬀect is to increase
z∗ (∂z∗




∂α). Using our numerical example, we are able to calculate these eﬀects. We ﬁnd that the overall
eﬀect of an increase in the importance social/economic concerns, or power (if α, or μ increase) is to increase
Country 2’s share.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examines the interaction between root causes, domestic policy considerations and the use of extrem-
i s ma sas t r a t e g i ct o o li na ne x t e r n a lc o n ﬂict. Using a two-country three-stage game, we show that, in general,
domestic policies will, indeed, be used strategically to achieve the required root causes and consequently the
desired level of extremism. We examine the eﬀects of changes in the environment and show that the level of
extremism decreases and social/economic conditions improve when a country becomes wealthier, more pow-
erful, more socially concerned, less nationalistic, less concerned with external versus internal considerations
a n dw h e nt h ev a l u eo ft h ec o n t e s ted asset decreases. These eﬀects, including the eﬀects on social/economic
conditions, are due to external strategic considerations, rather than domestic ones.
136A p p e n d i x
A.1





log(1 − λ + λq)+ [ αlog(z)+ ( 1− α)log(1− z)]. Assuming that we have an interior solution, the ﬁrst order
condition can, therefore, be written as:
H ≡
λ∂q/∂z





But, since ∂q/∂z >, we have
λ∂q/∂z
(1−λ+λq) > 0, so that we must have α−z0
z0(1−z0) < 0, or α<z 0, which means that
z∗ >z 0.




λ∂2q/∂z2(1 − λ + λq) − [λ∂q/∂z]2




(1 − z)2] < 0 (40)
A.2











∂z)]/(1−λ+λq)2 = −λβγ(1−z)μ(1−s)Aβ−2[(β −
1)(1 − λ + λq)+λβ(1 − q)] < 0.











∂H/∂z = − 1
∂H/∂zλ[
∂2q




∂z)]/(1 − λ + λq)2 > 0, since
∂2q








∂H/∂z = − 1
∂H/∂zλ[
∂2q










∂H/∂z = − 1
∂H/∂z
∂q
















Eﬀects On s :


































where T ≡ [θ2
∂2F2
∂s2 +( 1− θ2)∂2D2
∂s2 ] is negative from the concavity of F2 and D2.








∂s. It seems reasonable
that this eﬀect will be positive. It can be conﬁrmed (very easily, by using the mathematics programme Maple)
that, for all values of the parameters 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1,0 ≤ μ ≤ 1,0 <α<1,0 <λ≤ 1,
dq
ds is indeed positive. This
simply ensures “stability” in the eﬀect of an increase in s on probability q. It makes sense, since it implies
that as s goes up we cannot decrease the overall probability of the “good” outcome (no explosion).
Second, also note that we have one two possible equilibria: case (1) where sf <s ∗ <s d and case (2) where
sd <s ∗ <s f. In case (1) we have
∂F2(s∗)
∂s < 0 and
∂D2(s∗)
∂s > 0, but in case (2) we have
∂F2(s∗)






ds > 0 and that both F2 and D2 are concave, we then have the following:
1. ds∗










db = − 1
T [∂z




> 0 if sf >s d
< 0 if sd >s f
4. ds∗





> 0 if sf >s d
< 0 if sd >s f
5. Since a change in the parameters γ,μ,α,λ aﬀects the bargaining share, it is not easy to calculate the
overall eﬀect. These eﬀects are easy to calculate using the mathematics programme Maple. We ﬁnd that
∂2F2
∂s∂γ < 0, ∂2F2
∂s∂μ > 0, ∂2F2
∂s∂α > 0, ∂2F2
∂s∂λ < 0.
Eﬀects on Extremism, x :




ds < 0, since
dq











∂γ > 0, ∂x
∂μ > 0, ∂x
∂s < 0, ∂x
∂z < 0.

















< 0 if sf >s d







< 0 if sf >s d





































A.4. Total Eﬀects on the Bargaining Share:













dλ > 0, since ∂z∗

















dγ > 0, since ∂z
∗








dμ ?, since ∂z∗







dα ?, since ∂z∗








< 0 if sf >s d










< 0 if sf >s d





dρ > 0 if ρ shifts ∂D2





dρ < 0 if ρ shifts ∂D2
∂s down (for example, an increase in government 2’s domestic marginal cost of s).
7F o o t n o t e s
1. Two sources for a general discussion of political, economic and philosophical aspects of extremism are
Nozick (1997) and Breton (2002).
2. For examples of discussions of the behaviour of extremists see Rubbelke (2005), Victoroﬀ (2005), Ferrero
(2005), (2006), Blomberg et al. (2004a) and Wintrobe (2006a), (2006b). Shughart (2006) examines the history
of modern terrorism. Discussions of the “root causes” of extremism can be found, for example, in Blomberg
et al. (2004b), Feldmann & Perala (2004), Bandarage (2004) and Sandler & Enders (2004).
3. For an early discussion of strategies and power in conﬂicts, see Schelling (1960). For example, extremism
is viewed as a strategic tool in campaigning and elections in Glazer et al. (1998), Glazer (2002) and Glaeser,
et al. (2004); as a signalling or reputation device in Lapan and Sandler (1993) and Berrebi & Klor (2004)) and
16as a strategic tool in bargaining (Atkinson et al. (1987)) and in dealing with free rider problems (Appelbaum
& Katz (2007a)). There are also examples of economic models that give rise to extremism, but in which it
is not viewed as a strategic tool (for example, Roemer (2001) and Esteban & Ray (1999)). Esteban & Ray
(2006) consider a model with class and ethnic group formation and conﬂict. They examine the relationships
b e t w e e no fc l a s sa n de t h n i cc o n ﬂict and show that “ethnic conﬂict–as opposed to class conﬂict - may be focal,
and precisely in the presence of economic inequality”.
4. In a recent paper, Appelbaum (2007b) provided a similar model in which extremism is used as a strategic
tool. The focus of that paper, however, was diﬀerent: it studied “competition in extremism” between rival
countries, but not the root causes of extremism. In this paper, on the other hand, the focus is on the root
causes of extremism and in particular on the interaction between internal and external root causes.
5. In Collier (2000) a similar idea is used, where grievances are harnessed to instigate and succeed in
rebellions.
6. See references in the introduction section. For a discussion of the supply and demand of extremism see
Wintrobe (2006a).
7. It is, of course, possible to consider a model in which both countries pursue similar strategies and in
which extremists in both countries can cause an explosion. Later we will show that certain conditions will
lead to low levels of extremism. In this sense, assuming that Country 1’s extremists do not cause an explosion
is similar to the assumption that conditions in Country 1 are such that extremism is not likely to arise.
8. We assume here that the cost of deviations is linear. It is possible to take it as quadratic without
aﬀecting the results.
9. Alternatively, we aggregate the social and nationalistic frustrations by using multiplicative, or more
complicated aggregator functions. In a numerical example we conﬁrmed that the results remain the same with
a multiplicative measure.
10. It is possible to model the disagreement payoﬀsi nd i ﬀerent ways. This assumption is not necessary for
our results, but it simpliﬁes the analysis, somewhat. Our assumption is equivalent to the assumption that, in
case of a disagreement, an explosion that destroys the full value of the contested asset occurs with probability
1. Alternatively, we can assume that in disagreement only a fraction of the contested asset is damaged, and/or
none of the initial assets are damaged. While these alternative assumption change the threat point they are
not essential for our discussion.
11. There are other ways to model the allocation of the contested asset between the two rival, but in the
17political arena it is reasonable that the allocation/partition of the asset is determined in a bargaining process.
See Osborne & Rubinstien (1990) for a discussion of bargaining models and for justiﬁcations for the use of the
Nash solution.
12. Given concavity of F2 and D2, which are deﬁned over the closed interval 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, there is an optimal
solution for s. We veriﬁed concavity and uniqueness in our numerical example.
13. For simplicity, we assume that there is no overlap of the parameters of the domestic and foreign beneﬁts
functions, D2[s;·] and F2[z∗(s;·),s;·]. To the extent that there is such an overlap, our assumption implies that
the comparative statics result provide the net eﬀects of a change in the parameter. For example, if a2 also
appears in D2[·], in addition to F2[·], our results should be interpreted as providing the net eﬀect of a2. That
is: over and above the eﬀect that is due to the change in domestic marginal beneﬁts.
14. There is some support for these results in Chenoweth (2004), (2005), where it is argued and shown that
weakness, as captured by instability, can explain terrorism. Crenshaw (1981) also shows that terrorism is the
tool of the weak which tends to emerge when the “power ratio” is high. The eﬀect of power on extremism is
reminiscent of the notion that weak “failed states” lead to terrorism (see for example, Rotberg (2002), Mallaby
(2002) Fukuyama (2004), Eizenstat, Porter & Weinstein, (2005)). Shughart (2006) goes further, by suggesting
that the root of some nation-states’ weakness, which in turn tends to produce terrorism, is in their artiﬁcial
nature, created during the interwar period.
15. For a change in β we have d(1 − q∗)/dδ = βx(β−1) dx∗
∂δ + βxβ log(x).
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